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Abstract
In this paper we study the computational complexity of arbitrage in a frictional
foreign exchange market with bid-ask spreads, bound and integrality constraints.
We show that the problem of detecting the existence of arbitrage is NP-complete
in the general case and, moreover, for some ﬁxed  > 0, approximating the optimal
version of the problem within a factor of n is NP-hard where n is the number of
foreign currencies. On the other hand, we show that the optimal problem can be
solved in polynomial time for two special cases of the constant number of currencies
or a star-shaped exchange graph.
1 Introduction
Arbitrage is, arguably, the most important concept in ﬁnance. It is commonly
assumed that state variables of ﬁnancial instruments will disallow the exis-
tence of investment strategies with riskless proﬁt, commonly referred to as
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arbitrage opportunities. Active investment agents will exploit any arbitrage
opportunity in a ﬁnancial market and thus will deplete it as soon as it arises.
Experimental results in foreign exchange market, however, showed that this
theoretical doctrine might not always be true in reality. Examination of data
from ten markets over a twelve day period by Mavrides revealed that a signiﬁ-
cant arbitrage opportunity exists [13]. Some opportunities were observed to be
persistent for a long time. The problem become worse at forward and futures
markets coupled with covered interest rates, as observed by Abeysekera and
Turtle [1], and Clinton [3]. Diﬀerent reasons were proposed and examined. In
this work we are interested in this problem from a computational complexity
point of view.
Recently, there has been a growing research eﬀort in re-examination of con-
cepts in humanity and social sciences via computational complexity approach:
cooperative games [5], organizational structure [6], general equilibrium [7]. An
arbitrage condition in a frictional security market has also been shown NP-
hard under some realistic market conditions [4]. While NP-hardness usually
implies diﬃculties in ﬁnding a solution, the NP-hardness result for arbitrage
seems to be against the above well accepted doctrine of economics and ﬁnance.
Even assuming that an NP-hardness result here indeed implies the hardness
of ﬁnding all the arbitrage opportunities, it is still possible that those diﬃcult-
to-ﬁnd arbitrage opportunities are insigniﬁcant. In such cases, the principle
of bounded rationality [14] may oﬀer the following counter argument: there
may exist insigniﬁcant arbitrage opportunities but it is not worthwhile to ex-
ploit it by spending exponential amount of computational resource. On the
other hand, the fact that NP-hardness is proven under a set of reasonable
assumptions would make one curious in search of truth about computation
of arbitrage conditions. In this regard, complexity on approximability oﬀers
an answer to the proposal of bounded rationality in computation. Here we are
interested to determine whether an approximation (within in a factor of (1+)
for some ﬁxed constant ) to the optimal solution is not possible, or there is
a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS). Therefore, in order that
a quest into the arbitrage condition via computational complexity approach
conform to the principle of bounded rationality, we would like to know if we are
not able to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant large arbitrage opportunities (inappxoimability),
or more computational time would result in better approximation (PTAS).
The main result of this work deals with the approximability of arbitrage
in the foreign exchange market. In Section 2, we introduce the model of an
exchange market, together with an NP-hard proof that arbitrage in frictional
foreign exchange market. In Section 3, we present our main result of non-
approximability. In comparison, we note that two interesting models allow for
polynomial time solvability. One is with a central money, much like the of
role of US dollar set out in the Brenton Woods Agreement. Another is with a
market of a constant number of currencies which may be used as a supporting
argument for reducing the number of currencies, as is in reality.
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2 Models of Exchange Market
Exchange market starts historically in various forms. Barter market, where
merchant exchange wheat for eggs, is of the most primitive ones. Foreign ex-
change market is, in many ways, a virtual barter market, of dollars, marks and
yens. Formally speaking, we consider n foreign currencies: N = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
For each directed pair (i, j), one may change one unit of currency i to rij units
of currency j. Rate rij is the exchange rate from i to j. In an ideal market, the
exchange rate holds for any amount that is exchanged. An arbitrage opportu-
nity is a set of exchanges between pairs of currencies such that the net balance
for each involved currency is non-negative and there is at least one currency for
which the net balance is positive. Under ideal market conditions, there is no
arbitrage if and only if there is no arbitrage among any three currencies [13].
In reality, various types of friction exist. For example, bid-oﬀer spread may
be expressed in our mathematical format as rij rji < 1 for i, j. In addition,
usually the traded amount is required to be in multiples of a ﬁxed integer
amount, hundreds, thousands or millions. Moreover, diﬀerent traders may
bid or oﬀer at diﬀerent rates, and each for a limited amount. A more general
model to describe these market imperfections will include, for pairs i = j ∈ N ,
lij diﬀerent rates r
k
ij of exchanges from currency i to j up to b
k
ij units of
currency i, k = 1, . . . , lij, where lij is the number of diﬀerent exchange rates
from currency i to j.
Let x = (xkij) be a currency exchange vector such that
0 ≤ xkij ≤ bkij.(1)
There exists arbitrage in the market if there is a currency exchange vector
x = (xkij) satisfying the following inequalities with at least one strict inequality:
∑
j =i
lji∑
k=1
rkjixkji −
∑
j =i
lij∑
k=1
xkij ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n.(2)
Note that the ﬁrst term in the right hand side of (2) is the revenue at currency
i by selling other currencies and the second term is the expense at currency
i by buying other currencies. In addition, we require the currency exchange
vector x to be integral, i.e.,
xkij is integer, 1 ≤ k ≤ lij, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, i = j.(3)
Then the problem becomes NP-complete.
Theorem 2.1 It is NP-complete to determine whether there exists arbitrage
in a frictional foreign exchange market with bid-ask spreads, bound and inte-
grality constraints.
Proof. First it is trivial to see the decision problem is in the class NP.
Let us now describe a polynomial-time reduction τ from setcover [8,11]
to an instance of the decision problem.
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Consider an instance I of setcover: Given a collection C = {C1, C2, · · · , Cp}
of subsets of S = {e1, e2, · · · , eq} and positive integer K ≤ p, does C contain a
cover for S of size K or less, i.e., a subset C ′ ⊆ C such that every element in
S belongs to at least one member of C ′.
We construct an instance τ(I) of the decision problem with n = p+ q + 4
from I in the following way.
• Currencies: 1, 2, · · · , n.
• Rates:
rij =


1 if 1 ≤ i ≤ p, p+ 1 ≤ j ≤ p+ q and ej−p ∈ Ci,
1 if p+ 1 ≤ i ≤ p+ q and j = n− 3,
1
q
if i = n− 3 and j = n− 2,
K + 1 if i = n− 2 and j = n− 1,
1 if i = n− 1 and j = n,
|Cj| if i = n and 1 ≤ j ≤ p,
0 otherwise.
• Bounds:
bij =


q if i = n− 3 and j = n− 2,
K if i = n− 2 and j = n− 1,
1 if rij > 0, ij = (n− 3)(n− 2) and ij = (n− 1)n,
0 otherwise.
This completes the construction of τ(I). It is shown by the following graph
G1.
Now we claim that there exists arbitrage in market τ(I) if and only if C
contains a cover for S of size K or less.
We ﬁrst suppose that there exists arbitrage in market τ(I), i.e., there is a
vector x = (xij) satisfying (1), (2) and (3) with at least one strict inequality
in (2). Obviously, x = 0, in particular x(n−2)(n−1) > 0. By the integrality of
x and the bound b(n−2)(n−1) = 1, x(n−2)(n−1) = 1, from which it follows easily
that x(n−3)(n−2) = q, implying xi(n−3) = 1 for i = p + 1, . . . , p + q. We derive
further that, for each i = p + 1, . . . , p + q, there is h(i), 1 ≤ h(i) ≤ p, such
that xh(i)i = 1 and xnh(i) = 1, implying ei−p ∈ Ch(i) by the deﬁnition of rij,
and hence C∗ = {Cj ∈ C |xnj = 1} is a cover for S. Now let us show |C∗| ≤ K.
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Fig. 1. Graph G1
Indeed, it follows from (2) and (3) that
|C∗| =
p∑
j=1
xnj ≤ r(n−1)nx(n−1)n ≤ K.
Conversely suppose that C contains a cover C ′ = {Ci1 , . . . , CiK′} for S with
K ′ ≤ K. We deﬁne currency exchange x = (xij) as follows.
xij =


1 if Ci ∈ C ′ and ej−p ∈ Ci,
1 if p+ 1 ≤ i ≤ p+ q and j = n− 3,
q if i = n− 3 and j = n− 2,
1 if i = n− 2 and j = n− 1,
K ′ if i = n− 1 and j = n,
1 if i = n and Cj ∈ C ′,
0 otherwise.
It is easy to check that x = (xij) satisﬁes (1)–(3) with strict inequality for
i = n− 1 in (2). Hence there exists arbitrage in market τ(I). The theorem is
proved. ✷
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3 Non-approximability in General and Two Polynomi-
ally Solvable Special Cases
Now we turn to consider the optimal version of the arbitrage problem in a
frictional foreign exchange market with bid-ask spreads, bound and integrality
constraints. It can be formulated as the following integer linear programming
(P ):
maximize
n∑
i=1
wi{
∑
j =i
lji∑
k=1
rkjixkji −
∑
j =i
lij∑
k=1
xkij}
(P ) : subject to
∑
j =i
lji∑
k=1
rkjixkji −
∑
j =i
lij∑
k=1
xkij ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n,(4)
0 ≤ xkij ≤ bkij, 1 ≤ k ≤ lij, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, i = j,(5)
xkij integer, 1 ≤ k ≤ lij, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, i = j,(6)
where wi > 0 is a given weight for currency i, i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Then we have a further inapproximability result.
Theorem 3.1 There exists ﬁxed  > 0 such that approximating Problem (P )
within a factor of n is NP-hard.
Proof. As approximating the max-set-packing problem within a factor of n
is NP-hard for some ﬁxed  > 0 [2,9,15], to prove the theorem, it suﬃces to
show that the max-set-packing problem is polynomially reducible to Problem
(P ).
Consider an instance I of max-set-packing : Given a collection C = {C1, C2, · · · ,
Cp} of subsets of S = {e1, e2, · · · , eq}, ﬁnd a subcollection of disjoint subsets
C′ ⊆ C such that |C ′| is maximized.
We construct an instance τ(I) of Problem (P ) with n = 2p+ q+1 from I
in the following way.
• Currencies: 1, 2, · · · , n.
• Rates:
rij =


1
|Ci| if i = n and 1 ≤ j ≤ p,
|Ci|+ 1 if 1 ≤ i ≤ p and j = p+ i,
1 if p+ 1 ≤ i ≤ p+ q, 2p+ 1 ≤ j ≤ 2p+ q and ej−2p ∈ Ci−p,
1 if 2p+ 1 ≤ i ≤ 2p+ q and j = n,
0 otherwise.
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• Bounds:
bij =


|Cj| if i = n and 1 ≤ j ≤ p,
1 if i < n and rij > 0,
0 otherwise.
• weights: wi = 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
This completes the construction of τ(I). It is shown by the above graph G2.
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Fig. 2. Graph G2
Now let us show that each feasible solution of τ(I) corresponds to a set
packing of I with the same objective function value and vice versa.
First, given a feasible solution x′ = (x′ij) to τ(I), we deﬁne a subcollection
C′ = {Ci ∈ C | 1 ≤ i ≤ p and x′i(i+p) = 1}.
Then it derives from (4)–(6) that
x′ni = |Ci| if Ci ∈ C ′ and 1 ≤ i ≤ p,
n−1∑
i=2p+1
x′in ≥
∑
Ci∈C′
|Ci|,(7)
∑
{x′ij | 2p+ 1 ≤ j ≤ 2p+ q, ej−2p ∈ Ci−p ∈ C ′} ≤ |Ci|, p+ 1 ≤ i ≤ 2p,(8)∑
{x′ij | 2p+ 1 ≤ j ≤ 2p+ q, ej−2p ∈ Ci−p ∈ C ′} = 0, p+ 1 ≤ i ≤ 2p,(9)∑
{x′ij | p+ 1 ≤ i ≤ 2p, ej−2p ∈ Ci−p} ≥ x′jn, 2p+ 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1.(10)
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Using (7)–(10) we have
∑
Ci∈C′
|Ci| ≤
n−1∑
i=2p+1
x′in ≤
n−1∑
j=2p+1
∑
{x′ij | p+ 1 ≤ i ≤ 2p, ej−2p ∈ Ci−p}
=
2p∑
i=p+1
∑
{x′ij | 2p+ 1 ≤ j ≤ 2p+ q, ej−2p ∈ Ci−p} ≤
∑
Ci∈C′
|Ci|,
implying all the inequalities in (7), (8) and (10) hold with equality and x′ni = 0
if Ci ∈ C ′. Thus for 1 ≤ i ≤ p
x′ni
|Ci| − x
′
i(i+p) =0,
(|Ci|+ 1)x′i(i+p) −
∑
{x′(i+p)j | ej−2p ∈ Ci}=


1 if Ci ∈ C ′,
0 otherwise.
Clearly, the objective function value of x′ is equal to |C ′|.
To prove C ′ being a set packing, it suﬃces to show that the members of
C′ are mutually disjoint. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists ej ∈ S
belonging to members Ci′ and Ci′′ of C ′. As all inequalities in (8) and (10)
become equalities, we have
x′(i′+p)(j+2p) = x
′
(i′′+p)(j+2p) = 1,
∑
{x′(i+p)(j+2p) | 1 ≤ i ≤ p, ej ∈ Ci} = x′(j+2p)n,
yielding 1 = b(j+2p)n ≥ x′(j+2p)n ≥ x′(i′+p)(j+2p) + x′(i′′+p)(j+2p) = 2, a contradic-
tion. So C ′ is a set packing
Conversely, for a given set packing C ′ ⊆ C, we deﬁne a solution x = (xij)
of τ(I) as follows.
xij =


|Cj| if i = n, 1 ≤ j ≤ p and Cj ∈ C ′,
1 if 1 ≤ i ≤ p, j = i+ p and Ci ∈ C ′,
1 if p ≤ i ≤ 2p, 2p+ 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1 and ej−2p ∈ Ci−p ∈ C ′,
1 if 2p+ 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, j = n and C ′ covers ei−2p,
0 otherwise.
It is straightforward to check that the deﬁned x = (xij) is a feasible solution
to τ(I) and its objective function value is |C ′|.
Therefore approximating Problem (P ) with a factor of n is NP-hard for
some ﬁxed  > 0. This completes the proof. ✷
However, the maximum value of arbitrage can be found in polynomial time
for two special cases when the number of currencies is constant or the exchange
graph is star-shaped (a graph is star-shaped if all its edges have a common
vertex).
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Theorem 3.2 There are polynomial time algorithms for Problem (P ) if the
number of currencies is a constant or the exchange graph is star-shaped.
First, if the exchange graph G = (V,E) is star-shaped, clearly Problem
(P ) can be polynomially solved since there exist only exchanges between the
center currency and the other currencies in the market.
Next we consider the special case of a constant number of currencies. Writ-
ing ykji for rkjixkji, Problem (P ) can be reformulated as the following integer
linear programming (P ∗):
maximize
n∑
i=1
wi{
∑
j =i
lji∑
k=1
ykji −
∑
j =i
lij∑
k=1
xkij}
(P ∗) : subject to
∑
j =i
lji∑
k=1
ykji −
∑
j =i
lij∑
k=1
xkij ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n,
rkjix
k
ji ≥ ykji 1 ≤ k ≤ lij, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, i = j,
0 ≤ xkij ≤ bkij, 1 ≤ k ≤ lij, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, i = j,
xkij, y
k
ij integer, 1 ≤ k ≤ lij, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, i = j.
Hence (P ) can be solved in polynomial time [12].
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